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FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON EVIDENCE IN STATE
CRIMINAL CASES
By AUSTIN IV. SCOTT, JR.*
T IS SOMETIMES said that the admissibility of evidence in state
courts is simply a matter for the states to decide.' The ques-
tion to be discussed in this article is whether there are any
limits to this general rule as applied to state criminal cases, and if
so, what are the limits. In other words, does the United States Con-
stitution* impose any restraints on the states as far as evidence in
criminal cases is concerned?
The problem of federal restrictions on evidence in state crimi-
nal cases is but one aspect of the broader problem of federal control
over state criminal procedure in general-a matter to which the
United States Supreme Court has given much attention, particu-
larly in the last few years.' A number of Supreme Court cases have
dealt with the composition of juries in state criminal cases, 4 the
right of the accused in a state criminal trial to the assistance of
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. E.g., Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 599 (1904) involving the
effect of of the due process clause on evidence in a state criminal trial: ". . . it
is within the established power of the State to prescribe the evidence which
is to be received in the courts of its own government."
2. Or perhaps federal statutes enacted under the authority of the Con-
stitution.
3. See Boskey & Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal
Procedure, 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 266 (1946) ; Nutting, The Supreme Court,
the Fourteenth Amendizent and State Criminal Cases, 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
244 (1936) ; Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Supreme Court, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 869 (1948).
4. See cases collected in Scott, The Supreme Court's Control Over State
and Federal Criminal Juries, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 577 (1949) ; Boskey & Picker-
ing, supra note 3, at 279-82. The case of Cassell v. Texas, 216 S. W. 2d 813
(Tex. Crim. App. 1948), cert. granted, 336 U. S. 943 (1949), has recently
been argued and is awaiting decision by the Supreme Court.
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counsel,5 the use in state criminal trials of coerced confessions"
and other types of evidence illegally obtained,7 and the use by the
state prosecutor of perjured testimony," as well as the constitu-
tionality of a variety of other aspects of state criminal procedureY
What provisions of the United States Constitution are involved
in the problem of federal control over evidence in state criminal
cases ?1o Several provisions of the first eight Amendments---com-
monly referred to as the Bill of Rights--dealing with criminal
procedure may have a bearing on evidence in criminal cases."
But it is well settled that the Bill of Rights protects the indi-
vidual from action by the federal government and not the states,'12 so
that the Bill of Rights is not of itself determinative of federal con-
5. See cases collected in Boskey & Pickering, supra note 3, at 271-79.
More recent cases are: Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773 (1949); Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437 (1948) ; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736
(1948); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S.
672 (1948) ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640 (1948) ; Gayes v. New York, 332
U. S. 145 (1947) ; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134 (1947) ; DeMeerleer v.
Michigan, 329 U. S. 663 (1947) ; Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173 (1946).
6. See cases collected in Boskey & Pickering, supra note 3, at 282-95.
More recent cases are: Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949) ; Turner v.
Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62 (1949) ; Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68
(1949) ; Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 742 (1948) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S.
596 (1948).
7. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949) (obtained through illegal
search and seizure) ; Stemmer v. New York, Krakower v. New York, 336
U. S. 963 (1949) (obtained through wire tapping).
8. See cases collected in Boskey & Pickering, supra note 3, at 295-97.
9. E.g., the prosecution of the defendant by information rather than
indictment: Gaines v. Washington, 277 U. S. 81 (1928) ; Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U. S. 516 (1884) ; the right of the defendant to the privilege
against self-incrimination: Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) ; his right not to be put in doublejeopardy: Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937) ; his right to an im-
partial judge: Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927) ; his right to a trial free
from domination by a mob: Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923) ; Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915) ; his right to a public trial: In re Oliver, 333
U. S. 257 (1948) ; his right not to be convicted of a crime other than the
crime charged: Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196 (1948).
10. State constitutions-many containing provisions similar to those
of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution-do not of course
give the federal courts any control over state criminal procedure.
11. Thus the Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and
seizures and specifies the requirements for search (as well as arrest) war-
rants; the Fifth deals with the privilege against self-incrimination; and the
Sixth guarantees a speedy and public jury trial in criminal cases, the right
of the defendant to be informed of the accusation and to be confronted by
witnesses against him, his right to compulsory process to secure the attend-
ance of witnesses for him, and his right to the assistance of counsel. Although
at first glance the connection between some of these provisions and evi-
dence is not apparent, they all do have some connection, as will be brought
out in the discussion infra.
12. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 51 (1947); Barron v. Balti-
more, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833).
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trol over state criminal procedure. The Fourteenth Amendment,
on the other hand, does expressly apply to the states, providing in
part that no state "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'13 While this broad language
does not, of course, specifically mention criminal procedure or evi-
dence in state criminal cases, it is the principal basis of federal
control over criminal procedure in state courts. The due process
clause requires that the procedure in a state criminal trial be
such as to give the defendant a fair trial."
The due process clause, as applied to criminal procedure as well
as to a great variety of other matters of state action, is necessarily
very indefinite,1 - and the courts have had to deal with each new
situation separately as it arose. For many years a minority of the
United States Supreme Court justices have sought to give due
process a more definite meaning by taking the view, most elaborately
discussed in the Adamson case,' that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment necessarily makes applicable against the
states all the provisions of the Bill of Rights (including of course
the provisions which deal with criminal procedure) without the
necessity for inquiry as to whether a fair trial can be had without
the particular right. This application of the due process clause has
been frequently rejected over the years by a majority of the
13. The Fourteenth Amendment also contains the provision that no
state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." This provision is not of as great importance in the field of federal
control over state criminal procedure as the due process clause, except in the
cases involving exclusions of persons and classes from juries on account
of race or color, religion, sex, membership in economic or social group, or
political affiliations, as to which see Scott, supra note 4, at 581-598. The
Fourteenth Amendment also contains the "privileges and immunities" clause,
which, however, has been so limited since the Slaughter-House Cases, 16
Wall. 36 (U.S. 1872), that it can not be properly applied to restrict state
criminal procedure.
14. The Supreme Court has expressed this thought frequently in more
eloquent phraseology. See Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319, 325 (1937) : The due process clause requires of state criminal procedure
all that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." See also the much
quoted statement of Cardozo, J., in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97,
105 (1935) : The due process clause as applied to state criminal procedure
embraces "principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental." See Roberts. J., in Lienba v.
California, 314 U. S. 219. 236 (1941) : "As applied to a criminal trial, denial
of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential
to the very concept of justice."
15. The Supreme Court has often said that due process cannot be re-
duced to a mathematical formula. For the most recent expression of this
thought, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949).
16. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947), holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination was not vital to a fair trial. Justices
Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge dissented.
1950]
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Supreme Court,17 who have considered that some but not neces-
sarily all of those provisions are necessary to a fair trial. The
recent deaths of two of the Adamson dissenters, Justices Murphy
and Rutledge, probably insure the continuation for some time of
the majority view. Thus what the specific provisions of the Bill
of Rights makes applicable to federal criminal procedure is not
necessarily required for due process in state courts.',
For still another reason, quite apart from the differences be-
tween the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, criminal
procedure (including rules as to evidence) in the federal courts
may differ from such procedure in the state courts. The Supreme
Court has the power to condemn certain matters of procedure in the
federal courts not only as a violation of the United States Con-
stitution, but also, by reason of the Court's general supervisory
power over federal procedure, as improper (but not necessarily un-
constitutional) federal practice. 10 For the Court to condemn state
procedure, on the other hand, it must find that the procedure
violates the United States Consitution. Doubtless procedure ap-
proved by the Supreme Court for use in federal courts would neces-
sarily be due process if practiced by the states; but disapproval of
procedure in the federal courts (unless perhaps put on the ground
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 20 ) would not
necessarily mean unconstitutionality of such procedure if practiced
by the states.
2 1
Turning now from federal control over state criminal procedure
in general to the more specific problem of such control over evidence
in state criminal cases, the problem may be subdivided for purposes
of analysis into
(A) The conduct of the trial court,
(B) The conduct of the prosecutor,
17. In addition to the Adainson case, supra note 16, see Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949) (admissibility of illegally obtained evidence) ; Bute
v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640 (1948) (right to counsel) ; Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U. S. 319 (1937) (double jeopardy) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.
78 (1908) (privilege against self-incrimination) ; Hurtado v. California, 110
U. S. 516 (1884) (prosecution by information rather than indictment).
18. Note, however, that what the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment (the federal government shall not deprive a person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law) requires in federal criminal cases must
also be a requirement in a state criminal case, since "due process" has the
same meaning in both Amendments. See Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring opinion); Heiner v. Donnan,
285 U. S. 312, 326 (1932).
19. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340-41 (1943) ; see Fay
v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 287 (1947).
20. See note 18 supra.
21. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 659-60 (1948).
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(C) The conduct of the defense counsel,
(D) The conduct of the jury, and
(E) The conduct of the police
in connection with evidence.-' When does such conduct violate due
process?
This article will consider the various situations in which a
state criminal defendant may be denied due process with respect
to evidentiary matters. It will not attempt to show the manner in
which the defendant will have to prove that his constitutional rights
have been violated, 23 nor the procedural devices available to him
to secure a federal review in order to vindicate these rights.
2 4
A. THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL COURT
1. Rulings on evidence by trial judge
The defendant in a state criminal trial sometimes urges that the
trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is not simply
erroneous but so prejudicial to his case as to deprive him of a fair
trial.
The rules of evidence to be applied in the courts of a state are,
of course, for the state to determine. Thus the rulings of the trial
22. Perhaps another classification could be added: "Conduct of the
Legislature." What of the state legislature which provides that proof of one
fact is presumptive evidence of the ultimate fact which must exist for de-
fendant's guilt? The presumption is constitutional if there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, e.g.,
possession of policy slips is presumptive evidence of "knowing" possession,
Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904). But if the inference is not in
accordance with common experience, e.g., possession of firearms by one
formerly convicted of crime of violence or one who is a fugitive from
justice is presumptive evidence that the firearm had been shipped in inter-
state commerce, the statutory presumption violates the due process clause,
Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 (1943). "But the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments set limits upon the power of Congress
or that of a state legislature to make the proof of one fact or group of
facts evidence of the existence of the ultimate fact on which guilt is predi-
cated." Id. at 467.
23. The principal question here is the extent to which the federal
courts are bound by the conclusions of the state courts that no constitutional
rights were violated. The federal courts will examine the record to reach
its own conclusions. Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 466 (1947) ; Fay v.
New York, 332 U. S. 261, 272 (1947) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143,
148 (1944).
24. This review is often achieved by the defendant's applying to the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari. Often it is achieved by applica-
tion to a federal court for habeas corpus. The scope of the latter remedy
has recently been considered by the Supreme Court in Darr v. Burford, 70
Sup. Ct. 587 (1950). A third possible method of achieving federal review,
by the criminal defendant's seeking an injunction under the Civil Rights Act,
8 U. S. C. § 43 (1946) is considered in Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336
(N.D. Ga. 1947), allowing such an injunction restraining state police abuses.
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judge, either in admitting evidence of the prosecution which dam-
ages the defendant's cause,25 or in keeping out evidence favorable
to the defendant, 26 are normally procedural matters within the
power of the state to decide and do not deprive the defendant of
due process. This would be so even if the rule applied happens to
be different from the rule of evidence in the federal courts or in the
courts of other states. If the defendant claims that the rule of
evidence applied by the trial judge is erroneous under state law,
he may of course appeal to the state appellate court, but if un-
successful on appeal no federal right has been denied.
There are of course limits to this broad general rule. Thus,
as we shall see, the admission in a state trial of coerced confessions
or perjured testimony may deprive the defendant of due process.
So too the the state trial judge who prevents the defendant from
putting in any evidence at all-that is, who denies him an oppor-
tunity to be heard--denies him due process.2 7 Doubtless too a
25. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 58-59 (1947) (Admission of
evidence considered relevant by state court did not constitute denial of due
process, although defendant claimed the evidence inflamed the jury);
Buchalter v. New York. 319 U. S. 427, 430-31 (1943) (As to trial judge's
rulings on evidence and instructions to the jury, "the due process clause . . .
does not entitle us to review errors of state law however material under
that law. We are unable to find that the rulings and instructions under attack
constituted more than errors as to state law. We cannot say that they were
such as to deprive petitioners of a trial according to the accepted course
of legal proceedings.") ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 227, 228 (1941)
(1. Admission of relevant but shocking evidence did not deny due process.
"We do not sit to review state court action in the admission of evidence."
2. Admission of evidence of other crimes, under state rule allowing such
evidence to prove intent, design and system. did not violate due process. "The
Fourteenth Amendment leaves California free to adopt a rule of relevance
which the court below holds was applied here in accordance with the
State's law.") In a number of recent cases involving the admission under
state practice of evidence of other crimes under habitual criminal statutes.
the state supreme courts have found no violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. E.g., People v. Lawrence, 390 Ill. 499, 61 N. E. 2d 361. cert. denied
.sub nora. Lawrence v. Illinois, 326 U. S. 731 (1945) ; Thompson v. Harris,
107 Utah 99, 152 P. 2d 91 (1944). cert. denied, 324 U. S. 845 (1945) ; Surratt
v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 940. 48 q. F. 2d 362 (1948).
26. Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174 (1947) (in federal criminal trial
erroneous refusal to admit evidence did not deny d-e process) : ChanlinsT-v
v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 574 (1942) ; see Buchalter v. New York,
319 U. S. 427, 430-31 (1943).
27. Thus in Thomas v. District of Columbia, 90 F. 2d 424 (App. D.C.
1937), the trial judge, sitting without a jury. stopped the trial while a de-
fendant was on the stand, refused to hear any further of defendants' witnesses
or argument of defendants' counsel, and thereupon found defendants guilty
and pronounced sentence: held. that the defendants were denied the due
process requirement of a fair trial guaranteed in federal courts bv the Fifth
Amendment. Although the Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment
was involved, "due process" has the same meaning in both Amendments. See
note 18 supra. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257. 273 (1948), states that one of
the requirements of due process is that a state criminal defendant be per-
mitted to offer evidence in his own behalf.
[Vol. 34:489
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state court which allows a conviction where there is no evidence
tending to show the defendant's guilt of the crime with which he
is charged denies him due process.28
2. Rulings on evidence by trial judge in connection with lack
of defense counsel
A large number of United States Supreme Court cases have
dealt with the defendant's right in a state criminal case to the
assistance of counsel. 2 Some of these cases reveal that erroneous
rulings by the state trial judge as to evidence, in connection with
the defendant's lack of counsel, may deprive the defendant of his
right to a fair trial. Thus in the recent case of Gibbs v. Burke0 the
defendant was tried for larceny in a state court without the
aid of counsel, no counsel being offered him by the court. He con-
ducted his own defense. Since the defendant knew little, if any-
thing, about the rules of evidence, considerable inadmissible evi-
dence against him was allowed to go in without objection by him,
and certain clearly admissible evidence in his behalf was excluded.
While recognizing that the due process clause does not guarantee to
every state criminal defendant charged with a felony the right to
appointed counsel, the court held that the lack of counsel in this
case, coupled with the trial judge's inadequate protection of the
28. See Black, J., concurring in Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463,
473 (1943): The due process clause requires that "where guilt is in issue,
a verdict against a defendant must be preceded by the introduction of some
evidence which tends to prove the elements of the crime charged." Brooks v.
United States, 164 F. 2d 142, 143 (5th Cir. 1947) : ". . . due process . . . re-
quired for a conviction that the evidence be strong enough to exclude every
other reasonable hypothesis than the guilt of that defendant of the precise
[crimel charged." It would seem that a state trial court which does not
direct a verdict of acquittal under these circumstances, or a state appellate
court which does not reverse a conviction obtained under these circumstances,
denies the defendant due process. If. of course, there is some evidence tending
to show defendant's guilt of the crime charged, due process is not denied if
the trial court does not direct an acquittal or the appellate court reverse
the conviction.
29. See note 5 supra. Without going into the details of these cases the
law may be summarized as follows: The due process clause gives the de-
fendant in a state criminal case the right to such counsel of his own choice
as he can secure. If he is unable to secure counsel (usually because of finan-
cial inability), the due process clause may or may not require the appoint-
ment cif counsel to defend him, depending upon whether under the circum-
stances he can adequately defend himself-particularly in view of his age
and general mentality, his prior courtroom experience, the severity of the
prohbtle punishment if convicted, and the complexity of the issues involved
in the case. Even though he may be entitled to counsel, either appointed for
or secured by him, under some circumstances he may waive this constitu-
tional right, and either conduct his own defense or plead guilty. Under some
circumstances the trial judge must explain to the defendant his right to
counsel.
30. 337 U. S. 773 (1949).
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defendant in his conduct of the trial, particularly with respect to
evidence, did deprive him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.31
3. Rulings on evidence by biased or mentally incompetent
trial judge
What of the judge who makes his rulings on evidence on the
basis of a personal bias against the defendant, or who makes his
rulings in an arbitrary, wild fashion because mentally incompetent?
It is fundamental that the trial judge in any court, state or federal,
must be impartial and mentally competent, and a state criminal trial
before a biased32 or insane33 judge necessarily is a denial of due
process to the defendant. In such a situation it would not be neces-
sary to show that the judge's rulings were wrong or that his motives
were bad, since the situation itself is so dangerous as to amount
to a denial of due process.
4. Denial of continuance by trial judge
It not infrequently happens that the defendant in a state criminal
case claims that the trial judge denied him due process by rushing
him into trial without giving him adequate time to prepare his de-
fense, and in particular denying him time to secure defense wit-
nesses and evidence.14 His claim is usually that the trial judge
deprived him of a fair trial by refusing to grant his request for a
continuance. While the granting or denial of a continuance is nor-
mally within the discretion of the trial judge and no constitutional
31. A somewhat similar case is Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736(1948), where the uncounseled defendant was denied a fair trial because of
the trial judge's "foul play" or "carelessness," while sentencing the defend-
ant in reciting charges of which the defendant had been found not guilty.
Compare Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728 (1948), where the trial court
sentenced an uncounseled defendant under a misapprehension as to state law,
which counsel could have pointed out; held no denial of fair trial (fourjudges dissenting on the ground that the Tomnsend case was not dis-
tinguishable.)
32. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927) (judge's compensation de-
pended upon the amount of the fine) ; see Ex parte Wallace, 24 Cal. 2d 933.
938, 152 P. 2d 1, 3 (1944) ("Impartiality in a judge or juror is indispensible
to a fair trial."). A. L. I., Code of Criminal Procedure § 250 (1931) provides
for a change of judge on the ground that "a fair and impartial trial" cannot
be had by reason of the interest or prejudice of the trial judge.
33. See Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167, 176 (1912): "Due
process implies a tribunal both impartial and mentally competent to afford
a hearing."
34. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant in a federal crimi-
nal case the right to a speedy trial. Although the Supreme Court has not
ruled on it, doubtless the Fourteenth Amendment makes the same require-
ment in state criminal cases, since the defendant is likely to be severely handi-
capped by his witnesses scattering, their memories fading, etc., if trial is too
long delayed. See Note, 29 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 193 (1949).
[Vol. 34:49
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issues are involved,35 the denial in an extreme case may violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. The question of whether under the
particular circumstances the denial of continuance violates due
process arises most often in cases where the defendant is repre-
sented by counsel, and depends upon the extent of the defendant's
right to counsel in a state criminal case. As we have already seen,
many decisions of the Supreme Court have dealt with the de-
fendant's right to counsel under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 3 Assuming that the circumstances are such
that the defendant has a. right to counsel, this means that he has
a right to the effective assistance of counsel, including sufficient
time to consult with counsel and prepare his defense. 37 As the Su-
preme Court has said, "... . it is a denial of the accused's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial to force him to trial with such expedition
as to deprive him of the effective aid and assistance of counsel." 38
Whether the defendant's right to counsel was rendered valueless by
the speed with which the defendant was rushed to trial depends
of course on all the circumstances, including the amount of time
involved, counsel's familiarity with the case, the difficulty of reach-
35. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 228 (1941) (defendant asked
for continuance after prosecution rested its case; inadequate showing as to
identity of expected witnesses and nature of expected evidence; held, trial
court in exercise of its discretion did not violate due process) ; Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 450 (1940) (defendant arrested Monday, case
called for trial Thursday, at which time defendant's appointed counsel moved
for continuance to prepare defense; motion denied and case went to trial that
same day; held, no denial of due process) ; Franklin v. South Carolina, 218
U. S. 161, 168 (1910) (". . . continuance rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court .... It would take an extreme case to make the action of the trial
court in such a case a denial of due process of law.") ; Minder v. Georgia,
183 U. S. 559 (1902) (defendant's motion for continuance to secure attend-
ance of out-of-state witnesses denied; forum state could not compel their
attendance and witnesses refused to come voluntarily; held, refusal to grant
continuance no denial of due process).
36. See notes 5 and 29 sispra.
37. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932) (trial began "a few
moments" after appointment of counsel; held, violation of due process);
United States v. Helwig, 159 F. 2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947) (trial began one minute
after appointment of counsel; held, violation of due process clause of Fifth
Amendment) ; Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F. 2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938) (three days
between arraignment and date set for trial for murder, although case not
reached until two days later; trial held at a distance from scene of crime; held
refusal to grant continuance was violation of due process) ; see White v.
Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 764 (1945) ; Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 446(1940). See also Note, The Right to Benefit of Counsel under the Federal
Constitution, 42 Col. L. Rev. 271, 274-75 (1942) ; Pressly, The Right to the
Assistance of Counsel under the Federal Constitution. 23 Tex. L. Rev. 66,
72 (1944). In the somewhat analogous situation where the defendant is rushed
into a trial by mob pressure, a fortiori due process is denied. See note 9
supra. And this is so even if the haste was to save the defendant from a lynch-
ing. Downer v. Dunaway, 1 F. Supp. 1001 (M.D. Ga. 1932).
38. White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 764 (1945).
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ing witnesses, the seriousness of the crime charged, and counsel's
ability to give his whole time to the case. 9
Even in a case where the defendant in a state criminal case is
not represented by counsel, either because he chooses to defend
himself or because he cannot secure counsel and his situation is not
such that the state must furnish him with counsel, he is entitled to
enough time to prepare his defense, and, once again, rushing him so
quickly into trial that he cannot adequately prepare his case would
undoubtedly violate due process.
5. Evidence in connection with imposition of sentence by
trial judge
The due process clause undoubtedly requires that in a state
criminal case, the defendant must be given an opportunity, among
other things, (1) to be confronted by and to examine adverse
witnesses and (2) to present evidence in his own behalf.40 In the
recent case of Williams v. New York4 the problem was presented
whether a state trial judge denies the defendant a fair trial if, after
a trial resulting in a conviction, he takes into account, for purposes
of imposing sentence within the limits of maximum and minimum
punishment, information obtained outside the courtroom from
persons whom the defendant has not been permitted to confront or
cross-examine. The defendant was convicted of murder in a New
York trial, the jury by its verdict recommending life imprisonment.
A stautory presentence investigation by state probation officers
revealed a good many facts about the defendant's background which
could not properly have been considered by the jury on the question
of guilt, such as prior crimes for which he was not tried and con-
victed but as to which he had either confessed or been identified as
the perpetrator. At the time of sentence the defendant was present
and was not prohibited from introducing evidence, but he was not
given an opportunity to refute the statements in the probation re-
port or to cross-examine the persons who prepared the report. The
judge, not being bound by the jury's recommendation of life im-
prisonment, sentenced the defendant to death. The Supreme Court
held that the procedure followed did not violate due process, point-
ing out that modem theories of punishment, to the effect that
punishment should fit the criminal rather than the crime, require
that the trial judge be given an opportunity to utilize all pertinent
information about the defendant without being limited by any
39. See Note, 42 Col. L. Rev. 271, supra note 37, at 275.
40. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948).
41. 337 U. S. 241 (1949).
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of the restrictions imposed by rules of evidence that must be ap-
plied at the trial. Thus a distinction is drawn between the use of
evidence at the trial (where the question of the defendant's guilt
or innocence is determined) and its use for purposes of imposing
sentence.4 2
It has been noted that in the , illiams case the defendant was
not denied an opportunity at the sentencing hearing to put in any
pertinent evidence he wished. The inference from the opinion is that
a denial of this right might constitute the denial of due process.
6. Evidence obtained on his own by trial judge
In a state criminal trial by a judge without a jury, if the judge
by his own efforts outside the courtroom obtains damaging evidence
against the defendant for use in determining the defendant's guilt,
the defendant is denied an opportunity to be confronted by the wit-
nesses against him, and thus is deprived of a fair trial. What if the
judge sitting without a jury should take a view of the scene of the
crime, without the defendant being present? A recent state decision
held that such conduct on the part of the trial judge constitutes a
denial of due process. 43 The case seems inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Snyder v. Massachusetts,44 where it was
held that in a state criminal trial by jury, the jury's view of the
scene of the crime, in the absence of the defendant (whose request
to attend had been denied) did not constitute a denial of due process.
The Court pointed out that perhaps a view is not part of the "trial"
and the knowledge derived from a view is not "evidence"; but even
if it were, to allow a view does not necessarily mean a denial of fair
trial. Whether due process is denied depends upon whether the
defendant has been deprived in a substantial way of his oppor-
tunity to defend against the charges brought against him.
7. Comment on the evidence by trial judge
In a number of jurisdictions the trial judge may, in his discre-
tion, comment to the jury on the facts in issue in the case, even to
42. A similar question was raised in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9
(1950). Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death, but asserted he
iould not be executed because he became insane after conviction and sentence.
The Georgia courts determined he was not insane, on the basis of a report of
three doctors chosen by the governor as provided by statute, rather than by ajudicial determination. Defendant contended he was entitled to an opportunity
tc. he confronted by witnesses against him and to offer evidence on the
question of his present sanity. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia pro-
cedure was not a denial of due process.
43. People v. Cooper, 398 111. 468, 75 N. E. 2d 885 (1947), disapproved
in Note, 34 Va. L. Rev. 459 (1948).
44. 291 U. S. 97 (1934).
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the extent of expressing his opinion as to the defendant's guilt or
innocence.f ' This was the common law rule,46 but a number of states
have, by constitutional provision or statute, forbidden such com-
ment.4 7 Whether or not the states desire to allow comment is a
matter for the states themselves to decide, and their decision either
allowing comment"8 (at least if the trial judge points out that the
jury is to have the final say), or forbidding comment,4" involves no
issue of due process.50 Certainly it is possible for a fair trial to be
had in either way.
S. Comment by trial judge on defendant's failure to testify
Today in the state, as well as in the federal, courts a criminal
defendant is competent to testify in his defense. 51 If he fails to testify
in his own behalf in a state criminal case, a few states by statute
or constitutional provision allow the trial judge to comment on this
failure. 52 The Supreme Court has indicated that perhaps such com-
ment does not constitute a violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination ;3 but even assuming that it does, there is no viola-
tion of due process.5 4
45. See Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 457-59(1947). As to this practice in the federal courts the United States Supreme
Court has said that the trial judge's right to comment is an essential part
of trial by jury. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 13-16 (1899) (civil
case) ; see Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 288 (1930) (criminal case).
A. L. I., Code of Criminal Procedure § 325 (1931), provides that the trialjudge "may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and
credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper deter-
mination of the cause" but if he makes such comment, he "must inform thejury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact."
46. See Orfield, op. cit. smpra note 45, at 457.
47. Ibid.
48. Since the practice of allowing comment is countenanced in the
federal courts, see note 45 supra, a fortiori such comment is constitutional if
practiced by the state courts. See notes 19-21 and text supra.
49. People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 221, 179 N. E. 898 (1932), 80 A. L. R. 890
and Note (state statute forbidding comment held not to violate state con-
stitutional guarantee of trial by jury). Even if it is a violation of trialby jury to forbid comment, see note 45 supra, still the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the states to furnish criminal
defendants with a trial by jury. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900)(state criminal jury of eight constitutional under due process clause)
Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314 (1892); see Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U. S. 319, 324 (1937).
50. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 650 n. 4 (1948). "... both prac-
tices (allowing and forbidding comment) unquestionably represent 'due
process of law.'"
51. Orfield, op. cit. supra note 45, at 459. (Every state except Georgia.)
52. Id. at 460, listing California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, Ohio
and Vermont.
53. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 50 (1947) ; Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 114 (1908).
54. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
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B. CONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR
It is fundamental that the primary duty of the prosecutor,
whether state or federal, is to see that justice is done, rather than
to obtain a conviction.5 5 It is thus his duty to assist in giving the
defendant a fair trial and "to refrain from improper methods calcu-
lated to produce a wrongful conviction." ' 6 What conduct on the part
of a state prosecutor in violation of this duty will deprive the de-
fendant of his right to a fair trial within the meaning of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
The most obvious sort of misconduct which denies a fair trial
is the knowing use of perjured testimony to secure a conviction, as,
for example, where the prosecutor bribes witnesses to testify falsely
against the defendant. The Supreme Court has naturally condemned
this sort of conduct as unconstitutional.57 It might conceivably be
argued that due process is not violated, even in such a case, where
there is sufficient evidence which is not perjured to support a con-
viction.58 But even so, it is submitted that such a conviction could
not stand, and the federal court should not concern itself with
whether or not the defendant was actually prejudiced. In the similar
case of the prosecutor's intentional suppression of evidence or con-
cealment of witnesses favorable to the defendant, the latter is denied
due process,"9 and this would be so even though there is strong evi-
dence by the prosecution that he was guilty.
A more difficult question is whether the unknowing use of false
testimony by the prosecutor violates the due process clause. The
55. A. B. A., Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 5; Orfield, op. cit.
supra note 45, at 443; Berger v. United State, 295 U. S. 78 (1935) ; Read v.
United States, 42 F. 2d 636 (8th Cir. 1930).
56. Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935).
57. The leading case is Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).
Other cases are: White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1945) ; Ex parte Hawk,
321 U. S. 114 (1944) ; New York ex. rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U. S. 688(1943) ; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213 (1942) ; see Hysler v. Florida, 315
U. S. 411 (1942). In these cases, habeas corpus in the federal courts was
denied, not because the allegations of intentional use of perjured testimony
did not constitute a denial of due process, but because the defendant had not
exhausted his remedies in the state courts.
58. The MooneL, case, supra note 57, involved conviction "solely" based
on perjured testimony, and the Pyle case, supra note 57. speaks of conviction
"resulting from" perjured testimony. Compare the Hawk case, supra note 57,
where the conviction was based "in part" on perjured testimony. Hodge v.
Huff, 140 F. 2d 686, 638 (App. D.C. 1944) suggests that there is no denial
of due process "unless the false testimony is . . . entwined with other cir-
cumstances ......
59. See the cases note 57 supra. A. B. A., Canons of Professional
Ethics, Canon 5, reads: "The suppression (by the prosecutor) of facts or the
secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused
is highly reprehensible."
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Supreme Court has not finally settled this question. 0 In the lower
federal courts the authorities are split, some taking the view that
such use is not unconstitutional," others that it is. 62 It would seem
that a defendant convicted on such evidence has been denied his
constitutional right to a fair trial, at least where the false evidence
may have prejudiced the defendant. Conceivably here it might be
held that if there was sufficient evidence, excluding the false evi-
dence, to prove guilt, he has not been denied a fair trial.
A closely related problem-that of the prosecutor's suppression
in good faith of evidence favorable to the defendant-was raised in
a recent lower federal court case, where the prosecutor knew of
relevant and important evidence favorable to the defendant but
did not bring it forward at the trial because he wrongly thought
it inadmissible. The district court held that the defendant was
denied due process.63
Just as it does not violate due process for the trial judge to corn-
60. The fact that, in the cases cited in note 57 supra, the Court con-
demns the "knowing" use of perjured testimony is of course not conclusive
that the unknowing use thereof may not also be unconstitutional. However,
Hysler v. Florida, 315 U. S. 411, 418-421 (1942), may indicate that the
Supreme Court does believe that unknowing use would not violate due
process. The state supreme court denied defendant's petition for a writ
of error corarn itobis on the ground that the petition did not show the
responsibility of state officials for the testimony of a witness who later, after
defendant's conviction, repudiated his testimony. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed on the ground that the state court properly concluded that the
defendant's proof of denial of a constitutional right was unsubstantial.
Whether the Supreme Court thought this proof unsubstantial because of
lack of showing that the prosecutor knew of the fact that the testimony
was false, or because of lack of showing that it was false, does not clearly
appear. The dissenting opinion, 315 U. S. at 423, indicates that there may be
three situations to deal with: (1) the prosecutor knows it is false testimony;
(2) the prosecutor does not know but other state officials know; (3) no state
official knows.
61. Cobb v. Hunter, 167 F. 2d 888 (10th Cir. 1948); Tilghman v.
Hunter, 167 F. 2d 661 (10th Cir. 1948) ; Wagner v. Hunter, 161 F. 2d 601
(10th Cir. 1947) ; Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F. 2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944).
62. Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F. 2d 335. 338 (6th Cir. 1938), holding that
the Mooney case, supra note 57, is not limited to convictions obtained through
knowing use of perjured testimony; the due process clause "must with equal
abhorrence condemn as a travesty a conviction upon perjured testimony if
later, but fortunately not too late, its falseness is discovered, and that the state
in the one case as in the other is required to afford a corrective judicial
process to remedy the alleged wrong, if constitutional rights are not to be
impaired." United States v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (con-
viction in federal court held to violate due process clause of Fifth Amend-
ment).
63. Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946) (court martial
conviction of rape; defense that woman consented; evidence of woman's bad
reputation for chastity not brought forward by trial judge advocate; held,
denial of due process clause of Fifth Amendment).
[Vol. 34:489
FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS
ment on the defendant's failure to take the witness stand,64 per-
mitting the prosecutor so to comment is not such a violation.
C. CONDUCT OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
A lawyer has the right to defend an accused person, even though
he believes him guilty, 5 and often, as we have seen, the trial court
will appoint a lawyer to defend one who cannot afford counsel
of his own choosing."6 "Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer
is bound by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense
that fhe law of the land permits, to the end that no person may
be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.1'67 What
if the defense attorney, through incompetency or intentional mis-
conduct, represents his client in such an ineffective manner that
evidence favorable to the defendant is not brought out at the
trial, or evidence unfavorable to him which could have been kept
out is allowed to go in?
In a situation where the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires the state, because of the circumstances, to
appoint counsel for the defendant, the defendant is denied his con-
stitutional rights if the lawyer appointed is so incompetent that,
in effect, the defendant is still unrepresented.68 This is certainly
the case if appointed counsel is mentally incompetent, insane or
intoxicated, for instance. What if he is simply professionally in-
competent, so that he makes some serious mistakes in conducting
the defense? Incompetence of this sort, if of such a serious nature
as to deprive the defendant of the effective assistance of counsel,
should constitute a denial of due process. But obviously all errors
of judgment by defense counsel do not deprive the defendant of a
fair trial; if they did, a great many convictions would have to be
held unconstitutional. It is, of course, impossible to draw any hard
and fast line as to the point at which professional incompetence
constitutes a denial of due process.
Where the defendant employs his own attorney, it is more diffi-
64. See note 54 and text supra.
65. A. B. A., Canons of Professional Ethics, Canons 4 and 5.
66. The Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel in
federal criminal cases. Many states have similar constitutional require-
ments. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 467-71 (1943), for a complete list-
ing of state constitutional requirements as to the appointment of counsel.
And in many situations a state court which does not appoint counsel de-
prives the defendant of due process. See notes 5 and 29 supra.
67. A. B. A., Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 5.
68. Note, Incompetent Counsel as Ground for New Trial in Criminal
Cases, 47 Col. L. Rev. 115 (1947) ; Note, The Right to Benefit of Counsel
under the Federal Constitution, 42 Col. L. Rev. 271, 273 (1942).
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cult for him to urge that he has been denied a fair trial because of
his attorney's incompetence. It is sometimes said that since he
chose his lawyer, he is responsible for the latter's conduct, on a
principal-agent theory.69 Perhaps here he would be denied a fair
trial only if the attorney was actually mentally incapacitated.
Of course, if the defense attorney, whether employed by the
defendant or appointed for him, were to betray his client, as by
collaborating with the prosecutor to bring about a conviction, due
process would be denied.
D. CONDUCT OF THE JURY
Just as the trial judge, prosecutor and defense counsel must deal
with evidence in state criminal cases, so too the jury must deal with
it, though in a different way. It is, of course, the duty of the jury to
listen to and weigh the evidence in order to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause requires that
state criminal juries be impartial and reasonably competent. Thus
trial by a jury of which a member is insane/° or incapable of
properly understanding the evidence because of his ignorance of the
language, violates due process. So too a trial by a jury, of which a
member is biased against the defendant, violates due process. 7'
E. CONDUCT OF POLICE AND INVESTIGATORS
It frequently happens that in state criminal trials the prosecu-
tion offers evidence against the defendant which, while relevant on
the issue of the accused's guilt, has been secured through some
illegal means-by an illegal search and seizure or wire tapping by
police officials, for instance. Often the prosecution offers a con-
fession by the defendant, which the latter claims was the product
of police coercion. Does the due process clause of the United States
Constitution bar the use of such evidence in state criminal cases?
69. Note, Incompetent Counsel as Ground for New Trial in Criminal
Cases, 47 Col. L. Rev. 115, 117 (1947). The agency theory might even be
urged in the case of court-appointed counsel, but the argument is obviously
weaker where the defendant does not choose his own lawyer.
70. See Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167, 176 (1912): "Due
process implies a tribunal both impartial and mentally competent to afford a
hearing."
71. Ex parte Wallace, 24 Cal. 2d 933, 152 P. 2d 1 (1944) (holding that
the presence on the jury of a prejudiced juror violated the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment) ; see Fay v. New York. 332 U. S. 261, 288(1947) ; Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F. 2d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 1942). The due
process requirement of an impartial jury is closely analogous to the similar
requirement of an impartial judge. See note 32 supra.
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1. Evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
72
and the constitutions of all the states, 73 prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures. Under what circumstances a search or
seizure is unreasonable, or a warrant necessary, are matters that
have been the subject of much attention by the federal and state
courts, but need not concern us here. Assuming that the search or
seizure which uncovers logically relevant evidence against the de-
fendant is unreasonable, is due process violated if such evidence is
used against the defendant in a state criminal case?
At the outset it should be noted that since the famous Weeks
case74 such evidence is inadmissible in the federal courts, 75 not
because the Fourth Amendment expressly says so, but because
the protection afforded by this Amendment would be almost worth-
less if such evidence were admissible.76 About a third of the states
follow the rule excluding such evidence in their courts, while the
rest allow this evidence. 77 Is the rule of the latter states a denial of
due process?
72. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
73. Cornelius, Search and Seizure 8 (2d ed. 1930) lists the state consti-
tutions of all states except New York, which added a constitutional provision
in 1938.
74. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
75. There have grown up some limitations to this rule of exclusion of
evidence: (1) The rule does not apply if the defendant is not the one whose
rights were violated by the illegal search and seizure. (2) The rule does not
apply if the illegal search and seizure is conducted by persons other than
federal officials, unless federal officials instigated or cooperated in the search
or seizure. These limitations are criticized in Note, Judicial Control of Illegal
Search and Seizure, 58 Yale L. j. 144 (1948). That the second of these
limitations is not so firmly established as to be beyond abolition by the
Supreme Court is indicated in the recent case of Lustig v. United States, 338
U. S. 74, 79 (1949).
76. While there are certain remedies which a person may pursue whose
constitutional right to he protected from illegal search and seizure has been
violated-e.g., civil action for damages against the searching officer, and the
criminal prosecution of such a person, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25,
30 n. 1 (1949)-these remedies are in reality very ineffective in restraining
this type of police misconduct.
77. The rules in the various states are collected in the appendix to
Wolf v. Colorado, Id. at 33-39. Those adopting the federal rule of exclusion
are: Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Those rejecting the rule are Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California. Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada. New Hampshire. New Jersey. Ne-w Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, Vermont and Virginia.
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Although a number of states had previously held that the rule
allowing such evidence did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,7 8 it was only recently that the Supreme Court, in Wolf %,.
Colorado,"9 ruled on the point, the majority holding that the use
of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure was not a
violation of the due process clause. The Court held that while the
right to privacy protected against federal intrusion by the Fourth
Amendment is a fundamental right secured against state viola-
tion by the Fourteenth Amendment, yet the exclusion in state
courts of evidence so obtained is not a necessary part of that right.
Three judges dissented, agreeing that the protection against illegal
searches and seizures is a right secured by the due process clause,
but concluding that if this protection is to be effective the evidence
obtained in violation of the right must be excluded.
2. Evidence obtained by wire tapping
In these days of modern syndicated crime, a weapon often used
by police officials to detect crime and secure evidence is wire tap-
ping of telephone lines and the recording of telephone conversa-
tions. Many states have statutes making wire tapping a criminal
offense, although a few sanction the use of wire tapping by police
as a means of combatting crime.8° Does a state which permits the
use of evidence secured by wire tapping in a state criminal trial
violate any federal right?
First, let us briefly look at the development of the law as to the
use in the federal courts of evidence secured by wire tapping. In
Olnstead v. United States"1 the Supreme Court held that such evi-
dence was admissible in the federal courts, in spite of the rule of
the Weeks case -8 2 rendering inadmissible in federal courts evi-
dence obtained by an illegal search and seizure, because wire tap-
ping is not a search or seizure and so does not come under the
ban of the Fourth Amendment. In 1934 Congress enacted Section
605 of the Federal Communications Act83 prohibiting the inter-
78. E.g., Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 193, 93 So. 293 (1922); People v.
Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P. 2d 44 (1942) ; McIntyre v. State, 190 Ga. 872,
11 S. E. 2d 5 (1940) ; State v. Atkinson, 40 S. C. 363, 18 S. E. 1021 (1894).
79. 338 U. S. 25 (1949). Possibly the Supreme Court will give further
consideration to the relationship between state searches and seizures and
the due process clause. Petition for certiorari was filed on Dec. 24, 1949 by
defendant in Church v. Michigan from a decision by the Michigan Supreme
Court. 18 U. S. L. Week 3201 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1950).
80. Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping. 32 Cornell L. Q. 514
(1947), 33 Cornell L. Q. 73 (1947) ; Peskoe & Slatko, Wlire Tapping, 3
Miami L. Q. 604, 608 (1949).
81. 277 U. S. 438 (1928) (four judges dissenting).
82. See note 74 supra.
83. 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 605 (1946). For the history of
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ception (unauthorized by the sender) of communications by wire
and providing that "no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the exist-
ence, contents, substance.., or meaning of such intercepted com-
munication to any person ;" nor may any other person who learns
the existence or contents or substance of an unauthorized inter-
cepted communication divulge the same. The Supreme Court there-
after held that this statute prohibits testimony by any person in
federal courts as to messages overheard by illegal wire tapping,,"
or indeed the use of evidence indirectly obtained from the use of
knowledge gained from such messages, 5 and the law applies to
intrastate as well as interstate messages ;58 however, only a person
who is a party to the intercepted communication may object to its
use in evidence.8 7
The question now arises: does the United States Constitution,
or the above statute, impose a federal restriction on the states as to
the use in state criminal cases of evidence secured by tapping wires?
Certainly, as long as the Olnstead case is still law, the Constitution
does not require the states to bar such evidence; and even if the
Ohnstead case were not law, and thus if wire tapping did con-
stitute an illegal search and seizure, yet under the rule of Wolf v.
Colorado8" the states might constitutionally permit the use of such
evidence. The only real question then is whether or not Section 605
is intended to prohibit the use of such evidence in state criminal
cases and perhaps, if such was Congress' intent, whether Congress
can constitutionally do so.
This statute, providing that "no person ... shall intercept any
communication and divulge . . . to any person," is literally broad
enough to apply to divulgence in state courts. A number of state
decisions have held, however, tlat the federal statute does not
ban the use in state courts of evidence secured by wire tapping.,
some subsequent attempts to amend this statute, see Helfeld, Justice Depart-
ment Policies on Wire Tapping, 9 Law. Guild Rev. 57 (1949).
84. Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937).
85. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939) (condemning the
use in federal courts of "the fruit of the poisonous tree").
86. Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321 (1939) (intrastate communi-
cation over the wires of an interstate network).
87. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U. S. 114 (1942).
88. See note 79 supra.
89. People v. Kelley, 122 P. 2d 655 (2d Dist. Cal. App. 1942), aff'd,
22 Cal. 2d 169. 137 P. 2d 1 (1943) ; Leon v. State, 180 'Md. 279. 23 A. 2d
706 (1942), cert. denied sub norm. Neal v. Maryland, 316 U. S. 680 (1942)
Harlem Check Cashinz Corp. v. Bell. 296 N. Y. 15. 68 N. E. 2d 854 (1946);
People v. Stemmer, 298 N. Y. 728, 83 N. E. 2d 141 (1948), aff'd, 336 U. S.
963 (1949).
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One of these cases went to the Supreme Court, which recently
affirmed, by an equally divided court, the conviction obtained by
use of wire tapped evidence.90 In view of the question, brought
out in some of these state decisions, of whether Congress can
constitutionally, under the commerce clause, invade the field
normally reserved for the states under their police power to deter-
mine what evidence may be used in state courts, and in view of the
often announced rule of construction of statutes, that "where a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave
and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter,"01
it would seem that the statute does not apply to evidence in state
criminal cases.
Instead of tapping telephone wires, police officers sometimes in-
stall a detectaphone 92 and listen to or record conversations of a
criminal nature. The Supreme Court has held that this means of
obtaining evidence, as in the Olmstead case, is not a search and
seizure, nor is it an interception of a message within Section 605
of the Federal Communications Act; thus it is admissible in the
federal courts. 93 A fortiori, such evidence is not made inadmissible
in state courts by the United States Constitution or statute. Simi-
larly the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, without the
use of a detectaphone, would not be subject to a federal ban in the
state, or even in the federal, courts. If the police officers should
make an illegal entry to install a microphone or recording device,
it may be that such evidence would be inadmissible in the federal
courts,9 4 but doubtless would be constitutionally admissible in the
state courts. 95
90. Stemmer v. New York, 336 U. S. 963 (1949). Four judges voted for
affirmance, four for reversal, Jackson, J., not participating.
91. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909).
Another rule of construction applicable here is stated in the Harlem Check
Cashing Corp. case, supra note 89, with reference to § 605 of the Federal
Communications Act: "A Federal statute, it is recognized, must be presumed
to be limited in effect to the Federal jurisdiction and not to supersede a
State's exercise of its police power unless there be a clear manifestation to
the contrary," citing United States Supreme Court cases. See also Rosenzweig,
supra note 80, at 78-79.
92. A device which may be placed against a wall to pick up and amplify
sounds on the other side of the wall.
93. Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942).
94. The Court in the Goldman case, supra note 93, at 134, suggests
that if an illegal entry is made to install a detectaphone, conversations so
obtained might be inadmissible in federal courts on the ground of "con-
tinuing trespass."
95. The rule of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949) is applicable,
the illegal entry being analogous to the illegal search and seizure.
[Vol. 34:489
FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS
3. Confessions
Many Supreme Court cases have held that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use in state
criminal cases, of confessions obtained by violence, or threats of
violence.9 6 The law on this point is well settled.17 A more difficult
problem, which has recently confronted the Supreme Court, is the
admissibility in state criminal cases of confessions obtained as a
result of persistent interrogation alone. The problem becomes
particularly acute where the confession comes several days after
the defendant is originally taken into custody, and during the
period of questioning the defendant was not promptly taken, as re-
quired by the state law, before a magistrate for a preliminary hear-
ing."" Two questions are presented. First, is a confession to be
outlawed for use in a state criminal trial where it is the product
not of bodily torture or threats of torture but rather of long and
persistent questioning by the police? Secondly, is a confession to be
condemned for use in a state trial, although freely given, if obtained
during a period of unlawful detention?
96. See authorities cited in note 6 supra. The rationale of the rule
excluding such confessions has not been clearly brought out by the Supreme
Court and has been the subject of some dispute by the writers on the sub-
ject. Some believe the proper reason for exclusion is the unreliable and
untrustworthy nature of such evidence, 3 'Wigmore, Evidence § 822 (3d ed.
1940) ; others that the exclusion of such evidence is to deter police investi-
gators from this type of objectionable conduct; and still others that a police-
coerced confession violates the privilege against self-incrimination. Mc-
Cormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tex. L, Rev.
447, 452-57 (1938) ; Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34
Minn. L. Rev. 1, 27-30 (1949). The latter theory is, however, not enough
to require the exclusion of coerced confessions in state trials, since, as we
have seen, the privilege against self-incrimination is not embodied in the
due process clause. See note 54 supra.
Besides prohibiting confessions obtained by violence and threats thereof,
it may be that the due process clause also prohibits the use in state criminal
cases of confessions obtained by trickery and deception-as where the police
falsely state to the suspect that an accomplice has implicated him, or falsely
state that his fingerprints were discovered at the scene of the crime. Perhaps
the test should be: is the trickery such as is likely to produce an untrue con-
fession? 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 841 (3d ed. 1940).
97. The difficulty comes in determining what were the true facts as to
the circumstances leading to the confession, since normally the police, when
guilty of misconduct, will not admit it and impartial witnesses are not often
present. In a number of cases, however, the Supreme Court has found such
coercion in spite of the fact that the state courts had found otherwise.
98. The reason why the police behave in this way is obvious. Very
frequently they reasonably suspect a person of crime but do not have sufficient
evidence, until a confession is made, to warrant his being commited by a
magistrate. Also, the police realize that their chances of obtaining a con-
fession are much greater if the suspect is not first brought before the magis-
trate. Yet the law in most states requires the prompt taking of an accused
person before the magistrate for preliminary hearing. See A. L. I., Code of
Criminal Procedure §§ 35, 36, commentaries (1930).
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Three recent Supreme Court cases9" clearly show that the use
in a state criminal trial of a confession obtained under certain cir-
cumstances not involving force or threats thereof may violate the
due process clause. "There is torture of mind as well as body."'
10 0
The length of time and the persistence of the interrogation of the
suspect, especially if interrogation is conducted by relays of officers,
the failure to take him before a magistrate. for a preliminary hearing
as required by law, the nature of the place of confinement, the time
allowed for rest and sleep, whether the suspect was properly fed,
whether he was advised of his right to remain silent, whether
allowed to see his family or friends or counsel-all these are factors
making up the "total situation" out of which the confession came
and are to be considered in determining whether the confession was
the result of "torture of mind" and therefore condemned for use
in state criminal cases by the due process clause.
These cases also indicate that a confession made during a period
of unlawful detention is not necessarily condemned ,by the due
process clause. As we have seen, failure to take the suspect before
the magistrate is a factor to be considered along with other factors
in determining whether or not the confession was voluntarily given,
but if, in spite of the unlawful detention, it was voluntary, it would
seem that a state may constitutionally admit it in evidence.' 0 ' The
rule thus differs from the rule as to the admissibility, in federal
courts, of confessions obtained during unlawful detention,'10 2 which
confessions the Supreme Court has held to be inadmissible,' 03 with-
out consideration of their voluntariness or trustworthiness; but this
rule of exclusion in the federal courts is not based on a constitutional
ground but rather pursuant to the Court's general supervisory
99. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania,
338 U. S. 62 (1949) ; Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949).
100. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 52 (1949).
101. Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in the Watts case,
Id. at 57, states that "we should unequivocally condemn the procedure and
stand ready to outlaw ... any confession obtained during the period of
the unlawful detention." But the majority, as we have seen, did not condemn
the procedure on this ground alone. Mr. Justice Jackson in his separate
opinion concurring in the result of the Watts case, Id. at 58, expresses his
disapproval of Judge Douglas' views, stating that such views would mean in
practice the outlawing of all confessions.
102. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a) requires that persons arrested with or
without warrant shall be taken before a commissioner "without unneces-
sary delay."
103. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943) ; Upshaw v. United
States. 335 U. S. 410 (1948). In Mitchell v. United .,tqtes. 322 U. S. 65
(1944), it was held that a voluntary confession obtained before any illegal
detention 1-nd occurrpd w-s rot -4e -Admiqih1e in tl, fede'ql coiirtz by the
police's subsequent failure to bring the defendant before the commissioner
within the reasonable period of time allowed.
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power over criminal procedure in federal courts, exercised in this
case to insure more "civilized" standards of police investigatory
methods.
One of the three cases just discussed1 0 4 suggests but does not
answer another question: does the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment forbid a state to use a coerced confession against
a person other than the confessor? May the coerced confession of
one party to a crime, implicating a confederate, be used against the
latter? Although the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
answer the question, it seems clear that such use would violate
the due process clause. If the theory of exclusion rests on the un-
fairness of a trial with evidence so untrustworthy, 105 certainly the
confession is untrustworthy no matter against whom it is used. If
the theory is that the evidence must be excluded in order to deter
police officials from practicing uncivilized methods of investiga-
tion,1'..' the necessity for deterrence is applicable whether it is sought
to use the confession against the confessor or someone else. If the
theory of exclusion is that a coerced confession violates the privilege
against self-incrimination, 1 7 the coerced confession of an accom-
plice should be excluded, since the privilege protects a witness as
well as an accused person.10 s
4. Evidence obtained by lie detectors, etc.
Up to the present time the courts have almost uniformly held
that testimony as to the results of lie detector tests is inadmissible
either for or against the defendant in a criminal case.10 9 As long
as there is a question as to the reliability of these tests, as long as
the lie detector may implicate an innocent person,110 due process
104. Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62, 65-66 (1949).
105. See note 96 vupra.
106. See note 96 supra.
107. See note 96 supra.
108. 8 Xvigmore, Evidence § 2252 (3d ed. 1940).
109. See Notes, 34 A. L. R. 147 (1925) ; 86 A. L. R. 616 (1933) ; 119
A. L. R. 1200 (1939) ; 139 A. L. R. 1174 (1942). Some recent cases reject-
ing this evidence: State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 (1947);
People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942) ; Boeche v. State,
151 Neb. 368, 37 N. WV. 2d 593 (1949) ; Lefevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8
N. V. 2d 288 (1943). One case allowed this evidence: People v. Kenny,
167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (1948), disapproved of in Forkoscb, The
Lie Detector and the Courts, 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 202 (1939). The Kenny
case is weakened by the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
People v. Forte, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31 (1938). Of course the lie de-
tector may still be an important device for discovering evidence which is com-
petent, or for bringing about voluntary confessions which are competent. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. HipPle, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A. 2d 353 (1939).
110. Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 77, 86 (2d ed.
1948), states that at the present time there is at least a 5% margin of error
even with the best devices and operators.
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requires that they be inadmissible against the defendant as untrust-
worthy. Very likely the time will come when the courts will find
that the lie detector has attained sufficient scientific accuracy to
warrant the acceptance of evidence as to the results achieved. If
such testimony is offered to prove the defendant's guilt in a state
case, will he be denied due process? Doubtless when that time
comes the federal courts will hold that the defendant is not being de-
prived of a fair trial by the use of such evidence."'
What has been said of the lie detector is doubtless applicable
also to other "scientific" methods for ascertaining guilt, such as
the use of truth serums 1 2 or hypnotism.
CONCLUSIONS
We have dealt with a number of situations where the federal
government imposes restrictions on the states as to the admissibility
of evidence in state criminal cases. Should these restrictions be
more, or should they be less, stringent than at present? The answer
depends partly upon one's views as to the relative importance of
catching criminals on the one hand, and, on the other, of observing
the rules of fair play, even with respect to those who don't play
fair themselves. The answer also depends partly upon one's views
as to the proper relationship between the state and federal govern-
ments; how much control should the federal government maintain
over internal state matters? It may be argued that the truth as to
defendant's guilt or innocence is the all-important thing, so that
any state rules on criminal procedure which tend to produce the
truth are not subject to federal restrictions even though the state
has used methods not in accordance with ordinary notions of fair
play.:" Some of the federal restrictions considered in this article-
such as those relating to coerced confessions and the knowing use of
perjured testimony or the suppression of evidence-are obviously
111. If the defendant does not voluntarily submit to a lie detector test,
it might be urged that the results thereof cannot be admitted without viola-
tion of his privilege against self-incrimination. But see Note, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
1138 (1924) ; Inbau, op. cit. supra note 110, at 94-95. If the state should
allow such evidence, however, that ground alone would not violate due
process since, as we have seen, the privilege is not a part of due process.
See note 54 supra.
112. The drugs scopolamine and sodium amytal are called "truth
serums." It may be that while compulsory use of a lie detector does not
violate the privilege against self-incrimination, see note 111 supra, the
compulsory use of truth serums would be. See Inbau, Self-Incrimi,,ation-
What Can an Accused Person be Compelled to Do?, 28 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 261, 287-88 (1937).
113. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in the Watts and dissenting in the
Turner and Harris cases, see note 99 supra, at 59-60, seems to go almost
this far.
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proper and necessary. As to other possible restrictions-such as for-
bidding the use of illegally obtained but relevant evidence-the
choice is more difficult.
It is popularly considered that the Supreme Court judges who
most often vote to reverse state convictions on constitutional
grounds are the Court's great liberals 1 4 and that the judges who
vote to affirm state convictions do not share the formers' high re-
gard for individual rights. It does seem, however, that, while it is
absolutely necessary to give the defendant in a state criminal case
a fair trial, with proper observance, as to criminal procedure, of the
rules of fair play, it is not necessary to take an extremely strict
view of what constitutes a fair trial with fair play. Judges who
would reverse a state conviction because the state saw fit to allow
the prosecution to be begun by information rather than indictment,
or because the state provided for trial by a jury composed of some
number of jurors less than the magic twelve,"15 or who would
forbid a state to try a second time to electrocute a convicted mur-
derer because, on the first try, the device failed to operate properly 1 6
-such judges, while they may enhance their reputations for
possessing humanitarian views, go much too far in their restric-
tions on the states. A good deal of leeway should be left to the
states to develop their own notions of proper criminal procedure,
procedure which will enable the states to convict guilty persons
while affording accused persons a fair trial. It is submitted that the
Supreme Court has, in the main, achieved this goal by its decisions
in this important field of law.
114. 'Many of the eulogies following the recent deaths of the late
Justices Murphy and Rutledge emphasized the number of times each had
voted to reverse criminal convictions, concluding therefrom that each was a
great liberal. While I would agree that these judges were liberals, I hardly
think that bare statistics on their voting records in criminal cases is con-
clusive evidence thereof.
115. The Adamson dissenters, see note 16 supra. who believe that every-
thing covered by the first eight amendments to the Constitution are em-
bodied in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, must logically
include these restraints on state criminal procedure.
116. Louisiana ex. rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 452 (1947) (fourjudges dissenting on the ground that further electrocution might be a cruel
and unusual punishment forbidden by the due process clause).
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